We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where -re ‡ecting institutional constraints -…rms cannot di¤erentiate their wage o¤ers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we …nd that the presence of impersonal wage o¤ers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised o¤ers.
Introduction
This paper studies a labour market where both workers and …rms are vertically differentiated. In such a setting, if …rms could o¤er a personalised wage to each worker the outcome would be e¢ cient matching with (…rm-optimal) competitive wages. In practice, however, "equal treatment" is often imposed on o¤ers to certain subsets of workers, either by law or by convenience. For example, employers in the public sector are often required to o¤er the same or similar salaries to workers whose observable characteristics (such as education, job experience, etc.) are comparable, via
We are grateful to participants of the 2011 SIRE/BIC Microeconomic Theory Workshop at St Andrews for their comments. either salary scales or a more explicit equal treatment rule. 1 At the same time, the workers' productivity is often observable by the employers (through detailed CVs, recommendation letters, interviews etc.) who are restricted to compete in uniform wages for workers with di¤erent productivity levels. Our analysis suggests that these practices may have an implication not only on the wages of those who receive "equal treatment" but also on the wages of workers with high productivity who typically receive personalised o¤ers. In particular, we show that the inability to di¤erentiate o¤ers leads to ine¢ cient matching and lower equilibrium wages than when the …rms can make an individualised o¤er to each worker.
While ine¢ ciency is limited to the matching of the equally treated, whom we call "bundled" workers, the equilibrium wages are lower than those in the competitive equilibrium for both the bundled workers and for the workers who are more productive than them. Meanwhile, the workers receiving personalised o¤ers who are of lower productivity than the ones who receive a bundled o¤er, continue to receive the competitive wage o¤er from their e¢ cient match. In other words, the bundling creates no downward externality.
Speci…cally, the equilibrium o¤ers for the bundled workers result from mixed strategies by the …rms, and that necessarily leads to locally ine¢ cient matching.
It also leads to local wage compression: the wage of the least productive bundled worker is higher while the wage of the most productive bundled worker is lower than in a competitive equilibrium. In addition, the wages of the workers whose productivity is higher than those of the bundled workers are uniformly shifted down by the amount of gap between the most productive bundled worker's expected wage and his 1 In this paper, these constraints are assumed exogenous. One possible explanation is political pressures, especially from trade unions, towards "equality" among workers whose job grade/title is the same. Or, particularly for low-level positions for manual work, the cost of making individualised o¤ers may outweigh the bene…t of hiring (marginally) better matched workers. An alternative view is that, since wage compression through equal treatment is desirable for …rms, they might actively coordinate to sustain it, despite the matching ine¢ ciency it generates. competitive wage, compared to their competitive wages. That is, wage reduction relative to competitive wages spreads across o¤ers to workers who are more productive than the bundled workers and receive personalised o¤ers. Moreover, we show that it is more e¢ cient and also leads to higher wages if the bundled workers are distributed into many pairs rather than into fewer but bigger groups. We also consider the e¤ect of a quality threshold, where the job in high productivity …rms requires su¢ ciently high skills (productivity) on the worker's side. We …nd that the presence of such a quality threshold leads to less wage reduction.
The analysis of wages and matching under uniform wages was pioneered by Bulow and Levin (2006) . They showed that when …rms are unable to di¤erentiate o¤ers at all, wages are compressed and in the aggregate they fall relative to competitive equilibrium. At the same time, …rms'pro…ts increase, despite the presence of some matching ine¢ ciency. Their seminal work has been extended in a number of directions. Niederle (2007) allows …rms to o¤er multiple (ordered) contracts, and shows that the …rm-optimal competitive outcome is achievable in equilibrium. In a di¤erent extension, Kojima (2007) shows that if …rms have di¤erent capacities then the average wage may exceed the competitive benchmark (and hence …rms'pro…ts may decrease).
Azevedo (2011) takes a further step and endogenises the …rms'capacity choice. He
shows that impersonal wage o¤ers may yield an overall more e¢ cient outcome than personalised wages do. Using a di¤erent framework that features continua of buyers and sellers, Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2013) study e¢ ciency in investment and matching with respect to personal and impersonal wages.
In a directed search model, Michelacci and Suarez (2006) investigate a related scenario, where …rms choose whether to o¤er uniform wages (for example, because they cannot observe -or measure/demonstrate in court -the workers'productivities) or to bargain with the workers, once they have observed their productivity. When an equilibrium involving both choices exists, it is the low productivity workers who go for the posted wage and the high productivity ones for the negotiated one. This produces an adverse selection e¤ect, so the presence of the negotiated deals depresses the posted wages. However, the opposite e¤ect, which we …nd in our model, is ruled out by their assumption that in the ex post bargaining the outside options are exogenously normalised to zero. That is, once matched, the negotiated wage between a …rm and a worker is assumed not to depend on the equilibrium, only on the worker's productivity and bargaining power.
Matching and wages are a¤ected not only by the characteristics of wage o¤ers but also by the matching procedure itself. Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina (1998) propose simple hiring procedures to implement a stable matching in a subgame perfect equilibrium where …rms can make personalised o¤ers to multiple agents. Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008) and Sákovics (2011) study alternative settings where each …rm can make a personalised o¤er to a single worker at every stage. Since our focus is on the e¤ect of wage bundling, not on the matching procedures, we assume a matching procedure that guarantees a stable matching in equilibrium.
In practice, heterogeneous workers in the labour market do face di¤erent wage determination processes. Hall and Krueger (2012) document wage determination of workers with various quali…cations through a survey of workers. They …nd that more educated workers are more likely to negotiate wages individually before they take up their job, while less educated workers tend to work at posted wages that are not personalised. Brenµ ciµ c (2012) provides consistent evidence studying job advertisements, and moreover she …nds that advertisements with posted wages are more common for jobs that require less speci…c skills or experience. Since there is complete information in our model, impersonal wages in this paper can be interpreted as wages posted for a group of (e.g. low-skilled) workers, and personalised wage o¤ers can be thought of as those that emerge from individual examination of each worker from a (e.g. highskilled) group. Our analysis points to the interaction between those two di¤erent sets of workers.
The model
Workers and …rms are indexed from 1 to N , with N 3. The productivity of a worker is his index, and productivities of …rms are denoted by 0 < D 1 < ::: < D N . The output/revenue of a matched worker-…rm pair is the product of their productivities.
For simplicity, outside options of the workers and …rms are normalised to zero. The …rms simultaneously post a wage o¤er to each worker, but the wages for k workers are bundled: the …rms cannot wage discriminate among those workers. We have 2 k N . We denote the group of bundled workers by fh + 1; :::; h + kg, that is, we assume that the bundled workers are of similar productivity. We denote the (N k+1)-vector of wage o¤ers made by Firm i by W i = (w i 1 ; :::; w i h ; w i ; w i h+k+1 ; :::; w i N ), where w i j is Firm i's o¤er to worker j and w i is its common o¤er to the bundled workers. We choose a simple strategic form to describe the matching procedure: once the wage vectors o¤ered by the …rms are public, the workers choose sequentially, in decreasing order of their productivity, the wage o¤er that they want to accept (if any). Workers always choose the remaining …rm o¤ering the highest wage, and when o¤ered the same wage by di¤erent …rms they prefer to work for the most productive of those …rms. If Worker i accepts the o¤er from Firm j, both the …rm and the worker exit the market with payo¤s iD j w j i and w j i ; respectively.
Preliminaries
It is straightforward to see that, due to the complementarity in productivities, positive assortative matching (PAM) is the e¢ cient outcome in our model. The benchmark result is that, without restrictions on the wage o¤ers, PAM is indeed guaranteed in equilibrium:
Proposition 1 If …rms can make personalised o¤ers to every worker, then the resulting matching will be PAM, with the actual wages paid given by w 1 = 0 and
# for i = 2; 3; :::; N: These are a subset of the competitive wages that are given by w i 2
# for i = 1; 2; :::; N .
Proof. First, it is immediate that all workers (and …rms) must get matched in equilibrium. Next, suppose the matching were not PAM. Then we would have i; j; k; l such that Firm i < k hires Worker j > i and Firm k hires Worker l < j. Firm k could deviate and match i's o¤er to Worker j. Worker j would prefer this wage, so that the deviation payo¤ of Firm k is at least 2 jD k w i j , which cannot exceed Firm k's putative equilibrium payo¤ lD k w k l . Similarly, Firm i could deviate by slightly outbidding Firm k's wage o¤er to l. For this not to occur we must have jD i w i j lD i w k l . Combining those two conditions we have
Given PAM, we know that Firm 1 will be matched with Worker 1, who is the last to choose, so the …rm can hold him to his reservation wage, which is zero. Hence, w 1 1 = 0 and Firm 1's equilibrium payo¤ is D 1 : If Firm 1 hired Worker 2 for w 2 2 + " instead, then its payo¤ would be 2D 1 w 2 2 "; which by the above argument cannot exceed D 1 : Thus we have w 2 2 D 1 : Note that the highest wage Firm 2 is willing to pay Worker 2 given that it could hire Worker 1 for zero is D 2 : As it is costless for Firm 1 to make an o¤er to Worker 2 as long as it is not accepted, it could push up Worker 2's wage
Then by the above argument we must have that iD i w i
The argument for the set of competitive equilibria only di¤ers for Worker 1. There, a …rm other than Firm 1 may drive Worker 1's wage up to the maximum Firm 1 is willing to pay: D 1 :This then has a knock-on e¤ect on the rest of the wages by the above logic, leading to the set of competitive wages in the statement of the proposition.
The multiplicity of equilibrium wage pro…les arises from the fact that the …rms can costlessly drive up the wages for workers above their equilibrium match. As can be gleaned from the proof of Proposition 1, in order to have uniqueness, we need to prohibit …rms to make o¤ers that they would not like to be accepted.
De…nition 1 Given an equilibrium, a …rm's wage vector is equilibrium undominated
if and only if the …rm's equilibrium pro…t is no more than the pro…t it would obtain if another of its wage o¤ers were accepted.
Focusing on equilibrium undominated wage vectors, we can rule out any equilibria supported by unaccepted wage o¤ers that would otherwise (i.e. if accepted) reduce …rms'pro…ts, and select a unique equilibrium:
Corollary 1 There is a unique equilibrium in equilibrium undominated wage vectors, which is the …rm-optimal competitive equilibrium, with the accepted wages w c i = There is no explicit formula for w 1;N BL w c N ; but it is well-de…ned via a …nite algorithm.
The mixed strategy equilibrium necessarily leads to mismatch/ine¢ ciency, but …rms are still no worse o¤ than in their most favourable competitive equilibrium. As a result, workers (in aggregate) are strictly worse o¤ due to equal treatment.
As it will become clear, it is useful to relax the de…nition of positive assortative matching to …t our pooled-o¤er scenario: 
The main insights from the Theorem are that i) "wage compression" occurs not only for workers who receive equal treatment but also for those who are above the pooled range; and that ii) the equilibrium is built "from down up", in the sense that the existence of higher productivity …rms/workers does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome of the "bottom section" below the bundled range. The externalities are small even for those above the pooled range, as it is only the lower bound on wage o¤ers that is a¤ected by the behaviour of lower productivity …rms. In other words, wage di¤erentials among the …rms that hire a worker above the bundled range are the same as those in the competitive equilibrium, while their wages in absolute terms are lower than the competitive ones. The size of the wage reduction for every worker above the bundled range is the di¤erence between the unbundled competitive wage of the most productive worker in the bundle w c h+k and the upper bound of the support of wages o¤ers to the bundled workers w w h+1;h+k BL + w c h+1 , which, if o¤ered, must be accepted by Worker h + k. We will also see later that w c h+k w; and in particular w c h+k > w if there are three or more bundled workers (i.e. k 3).
As stated earlier, we assume that the wage vectors o¤ered by the …rms are public and the workers choose sequentially, in decreasing order of their productivity. Since workers have strict preferences, the sequential procedure leads to a unique matching conditional on any wage vector, which makes the analysis of equilibrium wage o¤ers tractable. However, by imposing a further restriction on unaccepted o¤ers in the equilibrium wage vectors, the equilibrium outcome in the Theorem can also be achieved via any centralised matching procedure that leads to a stable matching. 5 To prove the Theorem, we …rst characterise the unique vector of accepted wages in any equilibrium that results in GPAM. Next, we show that an equilibrium with GPAM indeed exists. Finally, we show that there are no equilibria which do not result in GPAM.
Our …rst lemma partially characterises the wages of non-pooled workers under GPAM:
Lemma 1 Consider any pair of adjacent workers in GPAM, i and i+1 such that i+1
(but not necessarily i) is unbundled. In any equilibrium with equilibrium undominated wage vectors we must have w i+1 = w i i + D i , where w i i is the upper end of the support of Firm i's (possibly mixed) o¤er strategy to Worker i:
Proof. First note that the o¤er to an unbundled worker must be in pure strategy, since in GPAM it is common knowledge whose o¤er will be accepted. Next, note that in equilibrium Firm i must not strictly prefer hiring Worker i + 1 at w i+1 to hiring Worker i at w i i . Thus we have iD i w i
The only reason to bid more than that would be if another …rm (with a smaller index) would be o¤ering more as well. However, that would be loss making if accepted, and thus it is ruled out by the equilibrium undominated wages restriction. Hence we have
It is easy to see that any o¤ers to bundled workers that have a positive probability of being accepted must be in mixed strategies. If there was an equilibrium in pure strategies, then a more productive …rm would prefer to match a less productive …rm's bundled o¤er, while the lesser …rm would want either to strictly undercut -thereby hiring the same worker as if she matched the higher …rm's o¤er but at a lower wage -or o¤er more, leapfrogging the better …rm. Proof. In GPAM Firms h + 1; :::; h + k play mixed strategies for the workers whose wages are bundled. Standard arguments imply that i) the support must be continuous; ii) two or more …rms make o¤ers anywhere on the support; and iii) there is no atom except for the bottom of the support.
Suppose that the lower bound of the support were less than w h + D h : Then by o¤ering w h h+1 = w h + D h ", Firm h would have a positive probability of hiring a worker of productivity no less than h+1; leading to a higher pro…t than in equilibrium.
At the same time the lower bound cannot be higher than w h + D h ; since then the …rms would strictly prefer to bid less than the lower bound to o¤ering the lower bound (as they would hire Worker h + 1 anyway, but for less). Because of the equilibrium undominated wages assumption, no …rm below h + 1 o¤ers a higher wage.
Due to GPAM, the bundled wage o¤ers made by Firms i > h + k do not a¤ect the outcome, so that the rest follows from Proposition 2 above. It follows from the Bulow-Levin algorithm for the computation of the mixed strategies that, since the lowest wage bid here is w h + D h instead of zero, all o¤er densities by the mixing …rms simply shift upwards by w h + D h .
We are now ready to complete the proof of the Theorem:
Proof of the Theorem.
We …rst show that there is an equilibrium that features GPAM. Consider the wages according to Theorem 1, with w i i+1 = w i+1 for i 2 f1; 2; :::; h; h + k + 1; h + k + 2; :::; N 1g and the rest of the wage o¤ers to unbundled workers equal to zero.
Note that by construction the wage di¤erentials among the unbundled workers are such that no …rm matched with an unbundled worker has incentive to deviate and attract another unbundled worker by matching his wage. Each unbundled worker (except Worker 1) receives the same two identical o¤ers, and they choose the one from the more productive …rm. Lemma 2 ensures that no …rm matched with a bundled worker has incentive to change its mixed o¤ers to hire a bundled worker.
It remains to be shown that, with respect to the strategy pro…le, no …rm matched with an unbundled worker has incentive to hire a bundled worker instead; and that no …rm matched with a bundled worker has incentive to hire an unbundled worker instead. Also, no …rm matched with an unbundled worker would pro…t from deviating and hiring a bundled worker. Firms i 2 f1; 2; :::; hg would have to bid more than w c h+1 to attract a bundled worker. However, Firm h + 1 (who is mixing) is indi¤erent to making such a raise which implies that …rms below it are strictly worse o¤ than o¤ering exactly w c h+1 and hiring Worker h + 1: By the construction of the competitive wages they are at best indi¤erent between the resulting payo¤ and their putative equilibrium payo¤. Similarly, Firms l 2 fh + k + 1; h + k + 2; :::; N g would be at best indi¤erent between hiring Worker h + k at w h+1;h+k BL + w c h+1 and their putative equilibrium payo¤. Moreover, Firm h + k (who is mixing) is indi¤erent to o¤ering a lower wage to the bundled workers, which implies that such a lowering would strictly decrease the expected payo¤ of any Firm l 2 fh + k + 1; h + k + 2; :::; N g:
So far we have established that GPAM is an equilibrium outcome, in which the accepted wages must be those speci…ed in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Finally, we show that any equilibrium allocation must feature GPAM. If the bundled workers are matched with the …rms of the same index set then the rest of the matching must be PAM, by the argument establishing PAM in the proof of Proposition 1.
Thus, all we need to show is that a bundled worker cannot be matched with a …rm outside of the index set of the bundled workers in equilibrium. Suppose that in equilibrium Firm i 2 f1; :::; hg hires Worker g 2 fh + 1; :::; h + kg. Then it must be that some Firm j 2 fh + 1; :::; h + kg hires either i) Worker l 2 f1; :::; hg; or ii) Worker m 2 fh + k + 1; :::; N g.
Consider Case i). The equilibrium wage o¤ers to the bundled workers cannot be in pure strategy, so Firm i must adopt a mixed strategy, being indi¤erent among all of its o¤ers made to the bundled workers. Let the highest wage in the support of Firm i's mixing be w i . Let the expected worker index when …rm i o¤ers w i be ( w i ). Then Firm j could deviate and o¤er w i , which gives the expected worker index of at least ( w i ). Thus the deviation payo¤ is at least ( w i )D j w i , which cannot exceed …rm j's putative equilibrium payo¤ lD j w j l , that is, ( w i )D j w i lD j w j l . Similarly, Firm i could deviate by o¤ering a single wage, which just exceeds w j l . Note that Firm i's expected payo¤ is the same regardless of the (mixed) o¤er it makes in equilibrium.
Hence it must be that ( w i )D i w i lD i w j l . Combining those two conditions we have
contradicting the hypothesis that j > i.
Consider Case ii). Now in order for Firm j not to deviate and make an (only) o¤er to the bundled workers equal to w i ; we must have mD j w j
The e¤ects of bundling restrictions
So far we have assumed that there is only one class of bundled workers from h + 1 to h + k, but clearly Theorem 1 can be extended to the cases where there are multiple groups of bundled workers, as long as each bundle consists of workers with consecutive indices. The number and size of the bundles have important implications for payo¤s and e¢ ciency. As it will become clear, the case of pairs of workers receiving a common wage is qualitatively di¤erent from the cases where three or more workers are bundled.
We start with the former case.
Bundles of two
Our …rst observation is that a two-worker bundle has no externalities on the remaining matches and wages. 
, which is the …rm-optimal competitive wage for Worker h + 2:
Proof. Let us have a closer look at the mixed strategy equilibrium, with mixing densities denoted by f i (w) for Firm i. Note that the bene…t from o¤ering a slightly higher wage w + dw than w is given by D j P i6 =j f i (w) dw, while the additional cost is dw. Thus for any w in the support, there must be two or more consecutive …rms within fh + 1; :::; h + kg that actually o¤er w, and the density functions of the mixed strategies for those mixing …rms j solve
(1)
If there are two bundled workers, the solution is given by f h+1 = 1=D h+2 and f h+2 = 1=D h+1 . As both …rms must mix over the same range and the only mass point is for the weaker …rm at the lower bound, Firm h + 2 mixes uniformly over [w c h+1 ; w], implying that w = w c h+1 + D h+1 = w c h+2 .
The corollary implies that when only two workers are bundled, the support of the mixed strategies is between the two competitive wages that correspond to the respective workers (h + 1 and h + 2). By bidding w c i Firm i (i 2 fh + 1; h + 2g) is matched with the same worker as in the competitive equilibrium. Therefore the expected pro…ts of both …rms are the same as in the …rm-optimal competitive equilibrium. Meanwhile, clearly the expected wage for Worker h + 1 is higher, and for Worker h + 2 is lower relative to their competitive wages. It is immediate that the workers as a group are worse o¤ -since they bear the cost of the potential ine¢ ciency of the match -and, therefore, the expected gain of Worker h + 1 must be less than the expected loss of Worker h + 2:
The remaining question we wish to answer is: Conditional on there being a twobundle, where should it be to maximise welfare?
Corollary 3 The least ine¢ cient two-bundle is at arg min
Proof. The probability of an ine¢ cient match is the probability that the more productive …rm makes the lower bundled o¤er:
The deadweight loss of the mismatch is (h + 2)D h+2 + (h + 1)D h+1 (h + 1)D h+2 (h + 2)D h+1 = D h+2 D h+1 : Thus the expected loss due to mismatch (the only ine¢ ciency) is D h+1 D h+2 (D h+2 D h+1 ) :
: Thus a su¢ cient condition for the optimality of bundling the bottom two workers is that the di¤erence between productivities is non-decreasing in h.
Finally, it is important to observe that Corollary 2 generalises to any number of size two bundles, by the very nature of the result that there are no externalities. In line with Corollary 3, all the size two bundles should happen at the bottom of the distribution if the di¤erence between productivities is non-decreasing in h:
Large bundles
Before we derive the o¤er distribution when k 3, let us …rst present the following result, which says that for any wage in the mixed range, the o¤ers by …rms with higher productivity …rst-order stochastically dominate those by …rms with lower productivity (c.f. Lemma 1 in Bulow and Levin, 2006) .
Lemma 3
If D j > D l , then in equilibrium for all w, F j (w) F l (w).
Recall that we denote the upper bound of the mixed wage o¤ers by w, which, if o¤ered must be taken by the most productive bundled worker, h + k. Using the above lemma we can show that larger bundles lead to further wage compression: Proof. Let V j be Firm j's pro…t with Worker j at w c j , and notice that the di¤erence in pro…ts that Firm h + 1 and Firm j such that j 2 fh + 2; :::; h + kg make in the …rm-optimal competitive equilibrium is given by V j V h+1 = (D j D h+1 )j.
Instead, in equilibrium the di¤erence is given by
whereŵ h+1 denotes the upper end of the support of Firm h + 1's strategy. From Lemma 3 the o¤ers by a higher …rm stochastically dominate those by a lower …rm, so that the second term is non-negative. Thus we have j h+1 V j V h+1 . We can guarantee a strict inequality if the upper bound of Firm h + 1 0 s o¤er is below w: By construction the (expected) pro…t of Firm h + 1 is the same whether or not a personalised o¤er to Worker h + 1 is possible. Therefore, the expected pro…ts of all other …rms matched with bundled workers are weakly higher than those under the …rm-optimal competitive equilibrium. Since a mixing …rm's expected pro…t is the same for any wage o¤er it makes with positive probability, any …rm that expects to hire a worse worker than in the e¢ cient match (with positive probability) must o¤er strictly lower wages than the …rm-optimal competitive one.
Thus, all we have left to show is that if there are at least three bundled workers, the highest o¤er Firm h + 1 makes is strictly below w: The solution of (1) if all the …rms bid over the same support is f i (w) = 1 k P h+k j=h+1 D 1 j D 1 i : It is straightforward to see that f h+1 (w) < 0; contradicting the hypothesis that all …rms bid over the same support. By Lemma 3 it must be that Firm h + 1 does not bid near w: Firm h + 1 enjoy a strict expected gain, while Firm h + 1 is indi¤erent; given this and the resulting ine¢ ciency, workers are strictly worse o¤ in the aggregate but lower productivity workers (h + 1 for sure) bene…t. The novelty here is that the lower wages propagate to the high productivity …rms hiring with personalised wages. That is, all the …rms above h + k are strictly better o¤ by exactly as much as Firm h + k is (since they hire the same worker as with personalised wages, but for w c h+k w h+1;h+k BL > 0 less). Naturally the opposite is the case for the high productivity workers above h+k.
Quality thresholds
Our analysis so far has assumed that every …rm's output is the product of D i and its worker's index. In practice, it may be that tasks involved in a high productivity …rm/job requires particular (high) skills in order to produce anything at all. This section considers how such a quality threshold may a¤ect our results. Suppose for simplicity that the output is zero if Firm i is matched with a worker of index i q or below, where q 2 f1; 2; :::; i 1g.
If there is no bundling, this restriction does not a¤ect the matching (PAM) or …rmoptimal wages because, focusing on equilibrium undominated strategies, the equilibrium wage of Worker i is determined in such a way that Firm i is indi¤erent between hiring Worker i and Worker i + 1. In other words, Firm i + 1's o¤er to Worker i does not play a role in equilibrium whether or not it can produce positive output with the Worker i, since it is better o¤ hiring Worker i + 1 by matching the (rational) o¤er from Firm i, than to hire Worker i (or lower) by matching the o¤ers he has received from …rms below i+1. This feature comes from the supermodularity of output, which implies the output di¤erential between Worker i and Worker i + 1 is larger for Firm i + 1 than for Firm i.
Consider the e¤ect of quality threshold on the match and wages of bundled workers. If q k, that is, if the threshold is relatively low, then the quality threshold does not change the equilibrium matching and wages with bundling. This is because i) from the above argument the equilibrium wages for Workers and f h+2 = 1 D h+1 . Firm h + 2's o¤er density is the same as in the case where there is no quality threshold, which implies the support of the o¤ers also remains unchanged.
However, the density of Firm h + 1 is lower than in the case without the quality threshold (and hence has a larger mass at w c h+1 ). Consequently Firm h + 2 is more likely to be matched with Worker h + 2.
The probability of mismatch is given by
The deadweight loss of the mismatch is (h + 2)D h+2 + (h + 1)D h+1 (h + 2)D h+1 = (h + 2)D h+2 D h+1 : Thus the expected loss due to mismatch (the only ine¢ ciency) is
h+2 ). Since the expected loss from mismatch in the case with no quality threshold is D h+1 D h+2 (D h+2 D h+1 ), 6 we can see that the cost of the loss in pro-duction from mismatch outweighs the e¢ ciency gain from the reduced probability of mismatch.
When a bundle contains three or more workers/…rms, the upper end of the wage distribution (of the bundled workers) becomes higher in the presence of a quality threshold. The o¤er densities for q = 1 with three types are as follows:
] with mass at 0
Without the quality threshold, the densities are
Therefore it is easy to see that the upper bound of the mixing support is higher with quality threshold, though still lower than in the …rm-optimal competitive equilibrium. 7 From Theorem 1 we know that the size of the wage reduction for every worker above the bundled range is the di¤erence between the unbundled competitive wage of the most productive worker in the bundle, w c h+k , and the upper bound of the support of wages o¤ers to the bundled workers w w h+1;h+k BL + w c h+1 . This implies that the wage reduction e¤ect for the workers above the bundled workers is weaker, when there is a quality threshold. 7 Following the notation for Theorem 1, in the absence of the threshold the upper bound of the support is given by w c h+1 + w h+1;h+3
Conclusion
Wage determination processes vary according to worker types: while high-skilled workers receive personalised (often negotiated) wages, many low-skilled workers work at posted wages that do not di¤erentiate between workers with slightly di¤erent quali-…cations or productivities. We have rigorously shown that the models of personalised and bundled wages can be integrated seamlessly. We have also demonstrated how those two di¤erent wage determination processes can interact with each other. In particular, impersonal wage o¤ers lead to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers (and …rms).
We have also derived comparative statics results about the size and number of bundles. Under reasonable assumptions on productivities, bundling is more e¢ cient -or rather less ine¢ cient -at lower levels of productivity. This is in line with the wide-spread salary policy of paying uniform wages at entry level positions but personalised ones higher up the echelon (Hall and Krueger, 2012; Brenµ ciµ c, 2012).
Throughout this paper we have focused on undominated wage o¤ers (hence …rmoptimal competitive wages) for unbundled workers. If competing …rms had an incentive to reduce the pro…ts of others -say, because they competed in the same product market -, then the wages could be higher than the …rm-optimal competitive level even if such incentive were very small.
